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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
BERTHA M. McCLURE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
vs.

10042

EDWIN E. DOWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. This appeal presents the question as to whether
or not in an action brought in this State to collect child
support arrearages, a defense can relevantly and successfully be asserted other than payment; namely, that the
mother deliberately violated restrictions upon her place of
residence and first took the children to Europe, choosing
to support them from her own independent resources, and
later concealed their whereabouts from the father.
6. The lower court held that no defense could be relevant other than actual payment, and entered judgment for
the net unpaid amount, including interest.
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c. Appellant seeks to reverse this judgment and to
have the case remanded for trial as to the equitable defense
sought to be imposed; and in any event to set aside that
portion of the judgment for interest.
d.

The material facts of the case are as follows:

Both parties are now before the Utah court, although
they were long since married and then divorced in other
jurisdictions. Jurisdiction of the Utah court, both as to the
parties and the issue involved, was stipulated (Tr. 7, 10,
11), the case originally having been initiated under the
Uniform Reciprocal Support Act (R. 1-8). It was further
stipulated that the child support payments for the twoyear period September 1, 1961 until September 1, 1963
under the decree of the sister state of Alabama had not
been paid (Tr. 11-12) for reasons which hereafter follow.
There is also no genuine issue as to the following facts:
a. The parties were married in New York December
12, 1950. Two children were born of this marriage, Kelly
Culnan, September 28, 1951, and Edwin E., Jr., November
11, 1956.
b. Anticipating divorce, the parties under date of
January 29, 1957 entered into a lengthy and carefully
drawn property settlement agreement, which is Exhibit
D-2 in the record.
c. Thereafter both of the parties established residence in Alabama, and then under date of February 6,
1957 the Circuit Court of Russell County, Alabama, made
and entered a decree of divorce (Ex. D - l ) . Custody of
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he children was awarded to the Mother, and the Father
pas ordered to pay for their support the sum of $150.00
ach per month.
d. The settlement agreement, but not the divorce
lecree, specifically provided that the Father should have
certain definite visitation rights as follows:
«* * * during the entire month of July or
August; during the entire period of the Easter,
Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays in alternate
years and on alternate week-ends for forty-eight
hour periods throughout the year."
Further, the Mother "will not, without the prior
written consent of the husband, change the permanent residence of said daughter and son nor remove
either of them to a place distant more than two
hundred fifty (250) miles from Westport, Connecticut, (Buffalo, New York and Port Colbourne, Ontario, Canada excepted) provided, however, that the
wife shall be permitted without such consent to
remove said daughter and/or son temporarily to
a place distant more than two hundred fifty (250)
miles from Westport for a total period not in excess
of ten (10) weeks in any one year, and further
provided that the wife shall be permitted to change
the permanent residence of said daughter and son
and to remove and keep them at a place distant
more than two hundred fifty (250) miles from
Westport if said change of residence is necessitated
by either the wife's remarriage or by reason of her
seeking and obtaining employment at such place.
In no event shall the wife remove said daughter or
son, either temporarily or permanently, to a place
distant more than two hundred fifty (250) miles
from Westport without giving to the husband notice
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by registered mail at least twenty-five (25) days
prior to the date of such removal, in which notice
she shall state the date of departure from Westport,
and the name of the place, including the street address, to which the children will be removed.
"If the husband is prevented from having visitation or custody as provided in this agreement by
reason of the temporary removal of the children,
a substitution of dates shall be made between the
husband and wife for those periods which the husband was prevented from visiting or having custody of said children. If the permanent residence
of the children is removed to a place distant more
than two hundred fifty (250) miles from Westport,
the parties shall, if the husband so requests, consult
and agree upon a different schedule of visitation
and custody dates for the husband.
<< *

•

*

"If the marriage between the parties shall be
dissolved," as it was, "By order, judgment, or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, the provisions made by this agreement for the support and
maintenance of the wife and for the support, maintenance, and education of their said daughter and
son shall be in full satisfaction, discharge," and so
forth; "and said agreement shall be incorporated
in and made a part of any such order, judgment,
or decree. However, this agreement and the provisions herein contained shall survive any such
order, judgment, or decree, or any amendment,
modification, or vacatur thereof and shall not be
superseded thereby." (Par. VIII, subsection (b).)
(Emphasis ours.)
e. Thereafter the parties observed and performed the
terms of the settlement agreement for some time, the
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Father moving to Utah and remarrying and the Mother
marrying one John F. McClure, whose name she now bears
as plaintiff in this proceeding. This latter marriage likewise did not survive, and plaintiff became entitled to and
still receives $650.00 gross per month from McClure in
addition to the $300.00 per month payable by appellant
(Tr. 17).
/. In November, 1960, when the McClure marriage
broke up, the Mother determined to leave the United States
for Italy (Tr. 18). For the purpose of this case and under
appellant's proffer, this departure was without appellant's
consent, and specifically was accomplished in the absence
of the written consent provided for by the terms of the
settlement agreement set forth above (Tr. 18).
g. Mrs. McClure requested defendant to send the
support checks to her in Rome in care of American Express. Defendant did so until September of 1961. At this
time, having been effectively deprived of all visitation
rights, the Mother being beyond the jurisdiction of the
courts of Utah, Alabama or New York, and being advised
that the funds he was sending were not being used for the
care and support of the children, appellant discontinued
payments. The immediate discontinuance was caused when
defendant sent an airplane ticket for the older child's transportation from Madrid, Spain, to Salt Lake City. But the
ticket was only used to New York; and then it is appellant's proffer — rejected as irrelevant by the lower court,
that the Mother and two children dropped out of sight;
and that despite appellant's attempts to locate them, he
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did not learn of their residence or whereabouts until a contact from plaintiff's attorney in April, 1963 — shortly before this action was brought to collect the omitted payments (Tr. 19).
As noted above, both parties appeared in person before the Utah court below, and stipulated that visitation
rights would now again be recognized and that the child
support payments would be resumed effective September
1, 1963. Thus the sole remaining issue became the Mother's
right to the omitted support money for the two-year period,
during which on her own resources and contrary to the
settlement agreement, she herself determined to live in
Europe indefinitely and to deprive deliberately the Father
of his visitation rights with his two children.
The trial court held that in such a case actual payment
would be the only available defense (Tr. 11). Accordingly
judgment was entered in the sum of $7,046.76 ($7200.00
less the cost of the used portion of the airplane ticket from
Madrid, Spain, to New York) (R. 16, 17). Appellant was
also assessed $420.00 for interest.
This appeal is from that part of the judgment only
which pertains to the net arrearages for the two years and
the interest thereon.
ARGUMENT
At the outset it should be noted that we do not have
the usual case where the welfare and actual present need
for funds for support of the minor children are involved.
In this case the Mother, with ample resources of her
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3wn and on her own initiative, voluntarily took appellant's
children along with the rest of her family to Europe for
an indefinite stay. She continued to support them from
ier own and other resources, and only when her whims
iictated did she return to this country with her children.
Even then it was at her own convenience and months later
when she finally bothered in 1963 to call upon the Father
md ask (1) for resumption of current payments, which
was willingly done as soon as appellant's visitation rights
were reestablished; and (2) for appellant to pick up the
tab for her European venture from September, 1961 to
September of 1963. The record is silent as to how much
if anything the Mother paid during this two-year period to
care for the children as she toured on her own through
[taly, Spain and possibly other countries, until eventually
she chose to return to New York and bothered to resume
contact with appellant.
Nor do we have the fact situation of Baker v. Baker,
119 Utah 37, 224 P. 2d 192 (1950). There, with his children in need and himself in contempt for default in paying
the attorneys' fees, costs and support money awarded by
the Court, the Father failed in his attempt to assert as an
excuse for evading his own social, moral and legal obligations, a technical breach by the Mother of the visitation
provisions when she had moved the children to Oregon
where were her other children, relatives and friends.
Then, too, we do not here have the case where the
j>7200.00 had been reduced to judgment in Alabama, so that
all the Utah court would be doing would be to give "full
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faith and credit" to the judgment of its sister State which
had vested the accrued payments in the Mother as payee.
It should also be noted that anticipatory settlement
agreements such as here involved are valid in New York
and elsewhere — indeed are "highly favored in the law".
Hill V. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P. 2d 417; Auten v. Auten,
308 N. Y. 155, 124 N. E. 2d 99, 50 A. L. R. 2d 246. The
agreements, although always subject to court scrutiny, are
sustained even though not included in the divorce decree.
Galusha V. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 22 N. E. 1114, 6 L. R. S.
487, 17 Am. Jur., Divorce & Separations, §§ 905-906; also
§ 920. But of course they cannot be used to avoid or defeat
continuing legal obligations and duties to provide under the
relevant circumstances adequate alimony and support
money. 17 Am. Jur. 894.
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF, HAVING VOLUNTARILY DEPRIVED THE FATHER OF HIS VISITATION
RIGHTS, FORFEITED HER RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR SUPPORT P A Y M E N T S
DURING THE PERIOD INVOLVED.
Utah clearly recognizes that a divorcee who voluntarily deprives the father of visitation rights with his children
may forfeit her right to reimbursement for support payments during the period involved, and that payment is not
the only defense to her action. In Larsen VS. Larsen, 5 U.
2d 244, 300 P. 2d 596, beginning at page 226 the Court
said:
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"It is stated on page 886 of 137 A. L. R.:
'It would seem, from a perusal of the cases,
that it is recognized by at least a majority of
the courts that circumstances may be such as
to enable a husband to avoid payment of permanent alimony or support and maintenancce
of children allowed by decree or order of court,
or at any rate payment of past-due instalments
thereof, on the ground of laches or acquiescence
on the part of the wife. However, as intimated,
the question as to whether such defense is
available in a particular case depends upon the
circumstances present therein. * * *'
"(1) A reading of the cases cited in support
of the above quoted statement discloses that relief
to the father of a minor from such support money
judgment depends on the view of the court determining the case as to what is equitable under the
circumstances. We conclude that the evidence is
sufficient from which the trial court could reasonably find facts which would support a holding that
the respondent is barred from recovering a part of
this judgment for back support money on the
grounds which the above quotation calls laches or
acquiescence but which actually appear to rest on
equitable estoppel.1 We are sending the case back
to make findings on those issues for we conclude
the evidence is sufficient to support findings either
way. The court may make such findings from the
evidence already received or the court in its discretion may allow the parties to reopen the case and
introduce additional evidence on such questions.
"(2) In Price V. Price,2 we held that because
the state is interested in the child's welfare the par2

Price V. Price, 4 Utah 2d 153, 289 P. 2d 1044.
lOpenshaw V. Opemhaw, 105 Utah 574, 579, 144 P. 2d 528.
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ents cannot effectively release future payments of
support money by agreeing with the other to that
effect. However, this does not mean that a mother
may not by her actions or representations, or both,
preclude herself from recovering past due installments of support money to reimburse her for the
money which she has spent for the support of the
child. Where the father's failure to make such payments was induced by her representations or actions and where as a result of such representations
or actions the father has been lulled into failing to
make such payments and into changing his position
which he would not have done but for such representations, and that as a result of such failure to
pay and change in his conditions it will cause him
great hardship and injustice if she is allowed to
enforce the payment of such back installments, she
may be thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of such back installments. So in this case if
the trial court finds from the evidence that appellant would not have left his job and gone on a mission for his church but for such representations
that she would not require him to pay such installments if he would just leave her and the child alone,
and that appellant in reliance upon her representations complied with her request and that thereafter
she supported the child and if such payments are
collected from him she will be entitled to them for
her own use and benefit, and that it would be a
great hardship on him to now force him to make
such payments, she would now be estopped from
forcing him to pay such past due installments as
accrued during the time he was filling such mission.
"(3) / / the child has been the beneficiary of
equivalent support and education so that the mother
is entitled to receive all of said past due support
money, she would be free to release, compromise or
waive that which is hers. But if the child had been
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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provided bare shelter and food, and denied the benefit of proper clothes and dental and medical care,
then the mother should not be free to waive that
portion of past due support money that the child
has not received. The authorities cited above hold
that this doctrine is applicable to this extent. It is
the prerogative of the trial court to determine these
facts and if he finds that facts exist to justify equitable estoppel, he should apply that doctrine and relieve the father from payment of the installments
to the extent indicated. Of course, as to future payments, there is no question but what she is entitled
to collect from the time she made demand, and appellant does not dispute this. He has been making
such payments since her demand for them." (Emphasis added.)
The test laid down by this decision for relieving a
ather of accrued child support is "what is equitable under
le circumstances". The test is certainly not the hard and
ast legal rule of the court below that payment is the only
efense.
The case now before the court has nothing to do with
uture payments of support and thus does not run afoul
f the Price case. The father is paying and since Septemer, 1963 has been paying $300.00 per month for the suport of his two minor children. The mother has also reBntly agreed to allow the father to visit with the children.
In our case it is only equitable that the accrued child
upport payments be forfeited because the husband did not
now where the children were during the period in ques:on; he attempted to locate them; the wife was financially
ble to live in Europe and to furnish the children "equiva-
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lent" support; and she deliberately deprived the husband
of his visitation rights during the two-year period. Furthermore, the action of the wife in removing the children
from the United States to Italy without the husband's consent or court approval was in complete disregard of the
terms of the settlement agreement. By representing that
one child would fly to Salt Lake City, Utah from Madrid,
Spain, when in fact she caused the child to fly only to New
York; in then causing the children to drop out of sight for
nearly two years; and by use of the money for things other
than the children, she induced the father, indeed precluded
the father, from making child support payments during the
period involved. His failure to pay payments totaling $7,046.76, needless to say will cause him great hardship and
injustice if the wife is now allowed to enforce the payment
of the back installments for the time during which she deliberately denied him the visitation rights to which he was
entitled. Now is there the slightest assurance that these
funds would be expended for the children, or could benefit
them by reimbursement of the Mother for any past care,
or otherwise.
Utah is not the only jurisdiction which precludes divorcees from recovering back support for such action. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court settled the problem for that
state in Weinbaum V. Weinbaum, 153 A. 303, (1931). In
that case the husband had a duty of support. This was
conditioned upon the husband having reasonable child visitation rights one day each week. The wife remarried and
moved from Rhode Island to Florida. The husband then
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;opped making child support payments. When the wife
^turned to Rhode Island, she filed a petition asking that
ie husband be held in contempt for failure to make the
lild support payments. The court stated:
"Under the facts appearing in the record, there
is no merit in the claim that the respondent is in
default in his payments while the petitioner was
residing in Florida. The obligation of the respondent to pay the weekly sum ordered for the support
of the child is conditioned on his being allowed
while a resident of Rhode Island to see her once a
week at reasonable times and places. The petitioner
in electing to take up her residence in Florida, taking the child with her, was no longer in a position
to comply with the terms of the decree, and consequently forfeited her rights thereunder so long as
she remained in Florida and retained custody of
the child."
In the case of Anderson vs. Anderson, 291 N. W. 508
1940), the Minnesota court was confronted with a situaon in which a divorced mother removed the child from
linnesota to California without her former husband's consnt and without the consent of the court. The whereabouts
f the child was kept from the husband. Later the mother
3Ught to recover for accrued child support and the trial
ourt denied relief. The wife appealed. The appellate court
tated:
"The trial court was correct in its action and
must be affirmed. The decision of this court in the
present matter was so clearly forecast by Eberhart
V. Eberhart, 153 Minn. 66, 189 N. W. 592, especially
after the explanation in Fjeld V. Fjeld, 201 Minn.
512,2 77 N. W. 203, that little basis even for specu-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
lation remained. In the Eberhart case we said, 153
Minn, at page 68, 189 N. W. at page 592: T h e
plaintiff has taken the child from the jurisdiction
of the court. So long as she keeps him without the
jurisdiction, the defendant should be relieved from
the payment of support money to accrue in the future and that already accrued should not be enforced against him.
"Plaintiff contends that a collateral attack is
being made by defendant on the decree and that
therefore it cannot succeed. We cannot agree. Defendant does not contest the validity of the decree
or the propriety of the order directing the payment
of $25 per month. Defendant's contention in its
essence is that the decree, though valid, cannot be
the foundation for an order compelling him to pay
plaintiff since she has placed herself in such a position by her conduct that she cannot now ask the
court to invoke its processes for her benefit. A
court should hesitate to grant relief to one who has
intentionally violated a material provision of the
decree which is sought to be enforced against another. Judicial power is vested in courts to aid
those who merit relief. Conduct such as plaintiff
has been guilty of certainly does not commend itself. There was no error or mistake on her part but
rather a deliberate and intentional act. While there
is no doubt that plaintiff could be punished for contempt if jurisdiction could be acquired we do not
think that this is the exclusive process. Nor need
defendant procure a modification of the decree. The
defense, under the facts, was well taken. There may
be instances where a party seeking to enforce a decree has been at fault in a minor respect but still
has equities that overbalance those of the party
seeking to avoid the natural obligation recognized in
the decree. In every case the primary duty and re-
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sponsibility rests upon the trial court in whom is
vested a proper sphere of discretion to decide each
case upon the facts as they appear.
"We do not think that plaintiff's return to the
state with the child made the decree, under the
facts, enforceable as to the accrued, unpaid instalments."
The most recent Minnesota case holding that a wife
>rfeits her claim to accrued child support when by removLg the child from the state she denies the husband child
sitation is State of Illinois, ex rel. Shannon VS. Sterling,
) N. W. 2d 13 (1956). The case was instituted, like the
le before this court, under the Uniform Reciprocal En>rcement of Support Act. Illinois was the initiating state,
he mother had removed three minor children from Illinois
ithout the mother's consent and without court approval,
he Minnesota trial court dismissed the matter on the
round that the father had been deprived of his right to
sit the children. The appellate court stated:
"The Minnesota law as to the liability of the
husband for the payment of unpaid installments of
support money which have already accrued is set
forth in Eberhart v. Eberhart, 153 Minn. 66, 68,
189 N. W. 592, wherein we said:
T h e plaintiff has taken the child from
the jurisdiction of the court. So long as she
keeps him without the jurisdiction, the defendant should be relieved from the payment of
support money to accrue in the future and that
already accrued should not be enforced against
him/ (Italics supplied.)
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"Under the above rule it is clear that, where
the wife, who by decree of divorce has been awarded
the custody of minor children subject to the husband's right of reasonable visitation, deprives the
husband of his right of visitation by removing the
children from the state without the court's approval
or without the husband's consent, the husband is
relieved from the payments of all unpaid installments of support money which have theretofore
accrued during the period he has been so denied his
right of visitation."
New York also recognizes that a divorced wife who
removes the children to a foreign country over the former
husband's objections, and thus effectively denies the husband visitation rights, is not permitted to recover child
support accrued during that period. Thus, it is clear that if
Mrs. McClure, plaintiff-respondent in this action, had litigated this matter in New York, her domicile and the state
in which the marriage was celebrated, she would not have
been able to recover for the accrued child support involved
herein. The New York case is Goldner vs. Goldner, 309 N.
Y. 675, 128 N. E. 2d 321 (1955), a New York Court of
Appeals decision. There the wife sought to hold the husband in contempt. The husband cross-moved to eliminate
the support provisions. The trial court granted the wife's
contempt motion and denied the husband's cross motion.
The husband appealed, and the appellate division (135 N.
Y. S. 2d 137) reversed the order, and held, as reported by
the Court of Appeals of New York, as follows:
«* * * (T)hat when separation judgment
provided both for child support and visitation
rights, but wife, over husband's objections, removed
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children from the jurisdiction and to a foreign
country for period of years, husband was entitled
to temporary suspension payments until children
were returned to jurisdiction when he might have
right of visitation."
POINT II.
In any event, no interest was due.
Had the wife not concealed the children and her
hereabouts, the payments could have been tendered and
3 interest would have accrued; but plaintiff made payLent impossible. Therefore, it would be unjust and ins t a b l e to assess interest in this case, at least until the
[aintiff reappeared on the scene and made demand for
ayment in April of 1963.
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS
& LATIMER,
Calvin A. Behle,
Milo S. Marsden, Jr.,
Attys. for Defendant-Appellant.
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